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ABSTRACT: This paper extends a Real Business Cycle model to an economy
in which monopolistic competitive ﬁrms’ technology is subject to idiosyncratic
and common shocks. The value of future technology rents drive stock market
valuation. We study how the arrival of new information about future technologi-
cal developments aﬀect each ﬁrm’s stream of future proﬁt, the rate on return on
physical capital, and the value of equity. We show that good news about future
technology of a speciﬁc ﬁrm or industry will lift the price of shares of the speciﬁc
ﬁrms, but that good news about future aggregate productivity will raise the dis-
count rate, leaving the price of shares unchanged. On the other hand, good news
about future aggregate proﬁt margins will lift the price of shares.
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11 Introduction
The question of the pricing of assets, especially of shares of stocks, has long been
of immense theoretical and practical interest. Early modern treatment can be
found in Arrow (1953) and in Radner (1972). Ever since, a vast body of litera-
ture has develop in many directions. However, to our knowledge, all recent papers
in the area make assumptions that yield an exogenous the stream of dividends
and/or an exogenous rate of interest that can be used to calculate present values.
For instance, the interest rate in Greenwood and Jovanovic (1999) is determined
endogenously, but the dividends are exogenous. In Zeira (1999), dividends are
determined endogenously, but the interest rate is exogenous (either by ﬁat or by
the small-open economy assumption) and deterministic. Indeed, there are many
papers in the area well deserving attention, but a general survey of the litera-
ture is well beyond the scope of this paper. Extending economic analysis to a
framework in which interest rates, dividends and share prices are all determined
simultaneously and endogenously would be highly desirable. Macroeconomic fac-
tors, such as the unexpected arrival of proﬁtable investment opportunities due,
say, to technology breakthroughs, or such as changes in the propensity to save,
are likely to aﬀect all of the previous variable simultaneously. Since these vari-
ables are all strongly related through some type of arbitrage condition, the eﬀect
of, or even direction imparted by these interactions is by no mean obvious.
For instance, the recent almost unprecedented rise of the stock market in
the US and other industrial countries has generated considerable interest, hope
and, in some, a sense of foreboding. Some very inﬂuential high-ranking members
of the business and ﬁnance community have issued words of caution, citing the
precedent of the Nikkei stock bubble of the eighty’s, or even more dramatic past
events. On the other hand, some ﬁnancial analysts have propagated, through the
popular ﬁnancial press, a much more optimistic view. They have argued that
the rapid maturing of a considerable range of new technologies has created the
prospect for unfathomable new wealth, the “new economy”. Hence, the recent
rise in the stock market is simply an expression of the expected future eﬀects
of these technological developments. Can the expectation of new technology by
itself explain dramatic price movements in the stock market? Certainly, at the
level of an individual ﬁr m ,a ne x p e c t e dt e c h n o l o g yb r e a k t h r o u g hw i l lm a k ea
ﬁrm more valuable than its competitors and its share price will express the new
situation. But would the same eﬀect hold at the aggregate level? An expected
increase in aggregate productivity ceteris paribus w o u l dt e n dt om a k es h a r e so f
stock more valuable, but this expected change in the future will also drive up
interest rates, putting in doubt the magnitude, or even the direction, of the net
eﬀect.
Although highly desirable, building a model to determine simultaneously stock
market values and interest rate raises diﬃcult technical challenges which, in our
opinion, explains the lack of progress in this direction. A meaningful model of
2the stock market should include some non-trivial form of heterogeneity among
ﬁrms and tackle the presence of risk to the investors, including preferably both
aggregate and idiosyncratic risk. Technology shocks will aﬀect both the value of
the shares of stock and the price the ﬁrm charges for its good, its market share
and its hiring of resources (labour and capital). In turn, owners of resources,
e.g. workers, and will react as consumers to these price changes, but consumers
will also react to capital gains and losses in the stock market by changing their
savings rate. In addition, consumers, in their role as investors in the ﬁnancial
markets, have to evaluate whether the price of each particular stock is “right”.
The latter point is especially non-trivial when one starts addressing the inherent
incompleteness of the market structure.
1.1 Outline of the model
This paper endeavours to address all of these issues. The baseline model is a real
business cycle (RBC)m o d e lw i t haﬁxed number of heterogeneous monopolis-
ticaly competitive ﬁrms àl aDixit-Stiglitz and identical representative inﬁnitely
lived agents àl aRamsey. This model ﬁrst appeared in Abadir and Talmain
(1998). Each monopoly ﬁrm produces a non-storable diﬀerentiated good which
is used as an intermediate product in the production of an homogenous ﬁnal
good. This ﬁnal good can be used for either consumption in the current period
or for physical capital formation in the next period. As this industry operates
under constant returns and is competitive, it plays no part in the stock mar-
ket. It does, however, generate a derived demand for the diﬀerentiated products.
Intermediate-product ﬁrms hire, in each period and in a competitive market,
physical capital and labour to produce their product. Because these ﬁrms are
monopolies, they generate proﬁts even after paying the rental and the wage bills.
In the tradition of the RBC literature, the ﬁrms’ technology is subject to random
shocks in each period, and the originality in our model is to let these shocks
be ﬁrm-speciﬁc, hence the heterogeneity. It is optimal for ﬁrms with higher
productivity to sell at a lower price in order to capture a larger market share.
Clearly, these ﬁrms will also earned higher proﬁts, hence these proﬁts are akin to
technology-based rent. The (endogenous and stochastic) stream of future proﬁts,
immediately distributed as dividend to the equity owners, creates value for the
ownership of a monopoly ﬁrm, and we assume that ﬁrm ownership is traded in
a stock market as shares of stocks. As each ﬁrm is associated with a unique
stream of future proﬁt s ,a n d ,a se a c hp e r i o da d d si n f o r m a t i o no nt h el o n g - t e r m
prospects of a ﬁrm, each ﬁrm will have its own value, and this value will ﬂuctu-
ate over time with the arrival of good news and bad news about its technology.
Financial investors have the choice between two types of investments, all risky:
physical capital, whose return is rental, and equity investment, whose return is
dividend plus capital gains (or losses). The representative agents hold the ini-
tial stock of physical capital and all shares of stocks; they inelastically supply
3labour. Hence, they receive all income in each period (there is no government
in this closed-economy). Given the stream of future wages and returns on the
various assets, agents must simultaneously decide on their consumption/savings
programme and on their portfolio allocation.
1.2 A simplifying remark
The reader will have noticed that nothing was said about the existence of a com-
plete system of Arrow’s state-contingent securities. It has been noted, see Magill
and Quinzii (section 33, pp 431-439, 1996)1, that incomplete asset markets often
lead to generic indeterminacy of the set of equilibria, i.e. not only is equilibrium
not unique but it is not locally unique: there is a whole interval [dimension 1], or
a whole disk [dimension 2], or a whole ball [dimension 3] .... of equilibria! The
assumption of a representative consumer help us out of this predicament. It has
been shown, Talmain (1999), that the equilibrium that prevails under a system
of complete asset markets can also be supported when such securities are not
present, providing there are M − 1 nominal assets, where M is the number of
types of agents in the economy. Since M =1in our case, no nominal asset is
needed and the asset markets are essentially complete: introducing a system of
Arrow’s securities will not change the real equilibrium; it is the real equilibrium
that will price these securities (revealing their shadow price).2
1.3 Results
Using the fact that asset markets are essentially complete, we derive the fun-
damental path of the economy in our model. This path is characterised by a
constant savings rate. Other equilibrium paths might exist, but there will be as-
sociated with a savings rate which tends to 1, almost surely, a very counterfactual
property. Furthermore, these paths are associated with capital stocks that are
so high (because the savings rate is close to 1) and interest rates that are so low
1As pointed out in Magill and Quinzii, indeterminacy of the real allocation would not arise if
all securities were real contracts. In our setting, shares of stock include a nominal component in
the form of possible capital gains and losses, hence indeterminacy of the real allocation cannot
be ruled out.
2The intuition for this result is very simple in this case. It has often been pointed out that
the system of state-contingent securities can be thought of as insurance. Consider ﬁrst the
situation in the absence of a system of Arrow’s securities. The representative agent selects
the best allocation available, which presumable incoporates some risk. Suppose the system of
Arrow’s securities is introduced. The agent would like to use these securities to trade away
the uncertainty of his allocation. However, there is no one else in the economy to trade with.
Suppose the initial price of one of these Arrow’s securities was initially “low”. All agents would
want to buy that security, bidding up its price. The bidding up will stop when the price at
which the security is trading corresponds to its shadow price, determined from the preferences
(more precisely, from the tangent hyperplan to the indiﬀerence surface) of the representative
consumer at its initial allocation.
4(since interest rate is negatively related with capital stock) that the sum deﬁning
present values do not converge!
In our model, we show that, in a rational expectation equilibrium in which
the data generating process validates the expectations of the agents, the current
value of the market portfolio depends on the rate of time discount preferences,
on the rate of proﬁts in the economy and on current output. In other words, no
advances in technologies in the future, whether the agents always anticipated it
or received unexpected news of such development, can explain a sudden increase
in the value of the stock market in the absence of a corresponding increase in
current output. The intuition is as follows. Good news about future aggregate
technology implies that the rate of return on physical capital will be high in the
future. The price of physical capital is equal to the price of the consumption good
as they are perfect substitutes, hence the good news cannot change the value of
current capital, i.e. the increase in the rate of discount is just enough to cancel-
out the increase in productivity of capital. We know now that future proﬁts are
discounted at a higher rate, but the good news means that these proﬁts will be
higher, so the eﬀect is still ambiguous at this stage. Suppose that the arrival
of good news were to cause an increase in the value of the stock market. This
increased wealth will cause a contemporaneous increase in consumption. Current
aggregate output is not aﬀected because the better technology has not arrived yet.
Hence, in the absence of a government/foreign sector, investment must decrease
to accommodate the rise in aggregate consumption, but this cannot occur because
t h ep r i c eo fc a p i t a li ss t i l lt h es a m ea st h ep r i c eo fc o n s u m p t i o n .
On the other hand, an increase in the future proﬁt margin, even in the aggre-
gate, will immediately lift the current value of shares.
Extension to open economy: if the stock market in the US goes up and the
preceding applies, then the overall stock market is constant and the stock market
oversee must go down.
2 Framework
2.1 Basic framework
We are considering an inﬁnite-horizon period economy starting at time t =0
which includes L identical representative consumers àl aRamsey and N mo-
nopolistically competitive ﬁrms whose shares of stocks are traded on the stock
market.
On the production side, there are three sectors: the ﬁnal good sector, which
is perfectly competitive, the leasing sector which owns the stock of physical cap-
ital in the economy and rents it out to monopoly ﬁrms, this sector is perfectly
competitive, and the intermediate good sector, which includes a ﬁxed number
N of monopolistically competitive ﬁrms each producing a non-storable diﬀeren-
5tiated product. The ﬁnal good sector uses intermediate goods as its only input
and the intermediate product sector uses labour and capital as its inputs. The
intermediate inputs are used solely by the ﬁnal good industry and the ﬁnal good
is either used for consumption in the current period or stored as capital for the
next period. We assume 100% depreciation of capital, i.e. output produced at
time t, that is not used for consumption in that period, becomes capital in the
next period and is destroyed in the production process (at an equilibrium, the
rental of capital will be such as to make capital formation a viable proposition).
On the consumer side, we adopt a inﬁnitely lived representative consumer
model àl aRamsey.3 The L representative consumers inelastically supply L units
of labour per period, owns all shares of stocks, all capital, uses its income in each
period to consume and to accumulate wealth in the form of capital formation and
(from the point of view of the individual) investment in shares of stocks.4
2.2 Aggregation and derived demand
2.2.1 Production
Final good industry A ﬁnal good industry, operating under perfect competi-
tion, uses this specialised inputs to produce a ﬁnal good according to the standard















where Yt is the aggregate output of the ﬁnal good industry, qn,t is the output of
ﬁrm n,t h eun,t are exogenous coeﬃcients that will capture the share of aggregate
demand that goes to each ﬁrm n at time t5 and (1/(1 − ρ)) is the elasticity of
substitution betweeen two products. The parameter ρ is also a measure of the
degree of competitveness of the economy, with competitiveness increasing with
ρ,w h e nρ → 1 this economy tends towards perfect competition.
The aggregate output Yt can be used either for consumption or for investment
purposes. Investment in period t increases the capital stock of period t +1 , i.e.
with a one period lag. In order to be able to derive a closed form solution for the
3We think of this representative agent as a paradigm for L dynastic agents with the same
preferences and the same initial endowment, with L large enough to justify perfectly competitive
behaviour. Since all agents face the same problem, they all behave in the same way and their
aggregate behaviour is simply a multiple of each individual (competitive) behaviour.
4It is clear that the aggregate excess demand for shares must be 0 in every period.
5We shall see that, if all ﬁrms employ the same technology (which will be characterised latter
by θn,t = θt), they will all optimise by charging the same price. Under this price structure, the
equilibrium output of ﬁrm n will be
qn,t = un,tYt
where Yt is the output of ﬁnal good: the output of the ﬁrm is proportional to un,t.
6intertemporal equilibrium of our economy, we need to assume, as in Devereux et
al. (1993, 1996), a 100% depreciation rate on capital. Hence, the stock of capital
in period t +1is equal to the investment of period t.
Intermediate product industry The productive sector of the economy is
composed of N inﬁnitely-lived monopolistically competitive ﬁrms. We assume
thatgoodn is produce according to a standard Cobb-Douglas production function
which takes capital and labour as inputs




n,t ,γ ∈ (0,1)
where, for ﬁrm n, θn,t is the technical eﬃciency and Kn,t,L n,t are the inputs of
labour and capital used up by the ﬁrm. Each ﬁrm n is characterised by its own
technology level θn,t. Individual productivities follow some autoregressive process
to be speciﬁed latter. An example of such a process would be a geometric AR(1)
process
logθn,t = αn logθn,t−1 +  n,t
where the shocks  n,t can incorporate a ﬁrm-speciﬁc component in addition to
the usual economy-wide component, and can be made to have a non-zero mean.
These monopoly ﬁrms will make positive proﬁts in each period. These proﬁts are
assumed to be immediately distributed as dividends to the share holders.
2.2.2 Allocation
Eﬃcient allocation Let us consider the problem of production from the point
of view of a Central Planner before addressing the question of the market alloca-
tion. At time t, the aggregate resources of the economy are either predetermined,
the aggregate capital Kt , or exogenously given, the aggregate labour L,o ra
combination of both, the productive structure of the economy characterised by
the number of monopoly ﬁrms N and their productivity θn,t.6 There exist an





















6Strictly speaking, one should also add the technology of the ﬁnal good industry, which is
unchanging over time in our framework.
7Since the agents only care for the ﬁnal good, either for consumption or investment,
this allocation would be the solution of the Central Planner problem. Deﬁning





the eﬃcient allocation of factors will yield the following relationship between
resources and aggregate output (in per-capita terms)
(2) yt = θtk
γ
t .
This eﬃcient allocation is characterised, for ﬁrm n,b yo u t p u t ,e m p l o y m e n ta n d



















As it turns out, the market allocation mechanism will yield this technically
eﬃcient allocation. This outcome is reminiscent of the ﬁrst theorem of welfare
economics, although the environment here is diﬀerent.
Market allocation The market allocation will be supported by characterised
by the following prices and quantities.
Prices of output Let pt be the price of the ﬁnal good, ˜ pn,t [resp. pn,t]b e





The relative price of a product is inversely proportional to the productivity of the






Factor prices and pure rent Let ˜ wt and ˜ ık
t and [resp. wt and ik
t]b et h e











8Then the real wage rate is proportional to output and it is an increasing function
of the capital/labour ratio. The real rental rate is a decreasing function of the
capital/labour ratio.






Let the nominal [resp. real]p r o ﬁts of ﬁrm n be ˜ Πn
t [resp. Πn
t ]. The real proﬁt
of ﬁrm n is proportional to output Yt,t ot h ew e i g h to ft h eﬁrm in demand un,t,














These proﬁts represent pure rent: they would disappear under free entry.
Share of the factors Let e ¯ Πt [resp. ¯ Πt] be the aggregate nominal [resp.
real] monopoly proﬁts





t , and ¯ Πt ≡
e ¯ Πt
pt
=( 1− ρ) Yt.





Output per capita yt is distributed among the factors as follows: the share of
labour, capital and proﬁt are respectively
wt
yt







=( 1 − ρ). (6)




t = ρy t.
The balance (1 − ρ)=( 1 /(1 + ν)) goes to proﬁts.
9Return on assets There are N +1assets in the economy, only one of
which, physical capital, allows for accumulation of wealth at the aggregate level.
The value of the other N assets, shares of stocks in the monopoly ﬁrms, follow a
stochastic path which is driven by technology considerations (for the fundamental
path) and expectations (for other paths) which are independent (at the aggregate
level) of the agents’ actions. The real return on holding physical capital from the
end of period t to the beginning period t +1is the real rental ik
t+1 only since
the rate of depreciation of capital is 100%. Let ˜ V n
t be the ex-dividend nominal
value of ﬁrm n at the end of period t.T h e ﬁrm value at the beginning of the
period is the with-dividend value V n
t + Πn
t ; this value is known at the beginning
of the period as all uncertainty for the period has already been realised. The








The nominal return ˜ ın


























Let the real aggregate market portfolio ¯ Vt of shares be deﬁned as the combined
value of all shares of stocks, and let ¯ vt be the (per capita) market portfolio and
vn
















The real return on the market portfolio¯ ıt+1 is deﬁned as the real return on holding



















Opportunity set There are L identical representative agents in the economy.
Consider the representative agent l. He supplies inelastically one unit of labour
per period. He also starts in period 0 with an initial endowment of capital
10kl
0 = k0 ≡ K0/L and with an equal share of equity in each ﬁrm. Hence, the real
value of his initial stocks holding is
¯ v
l









National income National income is the sum of earned and unearned in-
come. In per capita term, earned income is the wage rate wt. Unearned income is
composed of rental income ik
tkt and equity income, which includes proﬁti n c o m e
(rent) ¯ πt and capital gains ∆vt ≡ (¯ vt − ¯ vt−1). Hence, using the fact that factors’
income plus rent adds up to aggregate output yt, national income per capita,
which is also the income yl
t of agent l,i s
y
l
t = nit = yt + ∆vt.
Dynamic budget constraint Given the holdings of capital kl




t−1of share holdings in each ﬁrm n at the end of period t − 1,













he must allocate his resources between consumption cl
t, and acquisition of assets
for next period, either as capital for next period kl
t+1 or as shares in monopoly
ﬁrms v
l,n






















Let us deﬁne al
t as the real value of the ﬁnancial wealth of the consumer at















a n dl e tt h er e a lr e t u r no na g g r e g a t eﬁnancial wealth of consumer l, i
l
















return which is determined by the consumer through his (endogenous) portfolio







t−1 + wt − c
l
t.
11Intertemporal budget constraint The opportunity set of the consumer
can also been investigated from his initial position at time 0. Consider a particular





t=0 and real wage income w ≡
{wt}
∞
t=0. Of course, such realisation is only known “at the end of time”. Let us
deﬁne a discount factor between period 0 and period t based on the rate of return







Assuming that all the following sums do converge, we deﬁne PV 0 (c) and PV 0 (w)














Notionally, these two present values are stochastic variables (in a continuous-
time context, they would be Itô’s integrals). However, we will see that these
sums turn out to be deterministic variables on the fundamental path. On every














0+PV 0 (w)= ⇒ PV 0 (c)=¯ v0+¯ π0+i
k
0k0+PV 0 (w),
the last equality holding due to the representative agent assumption.
Optimization The problem of the consumer is to maximize his expected






































operator with respect to the information available at time t and his expectations
Il
t at time t about the future.
The consumer must devise both a consumption/savings programme to smooth
and to insure his consumption over time, and a portfolio diversiﬁcation strategy
that will exhaust all subjective arbitrage opportunities. Both of these require-
ments are expressed in the Euler equation which states that, for every asset x






or even the return on a speciﬁc share as the underlying interest rate.
However, the Euler equations will insure that all of these deﬁnitions would produce the same
valuation of future consumption from the point of view of the consumer.
12available to the consumer (i.e. physical capital and the equity in monopoly ﬁrms)
with real return ix
















Hence, the consumer must devise a consumption programme that (i)i sa
Euler path - it satisﬁes (9), and (iia)e i t h e rs a t i s ﬁes the intertemporal budget
constraint (8) if the inﬁnite sums that deﬁne the present value converge, or (iib)
satisﬁes the dynamic budget constraint (7) plus some borrowing constraint such
as a no-Ponzi-Game constraint.
3 Dynamic Equilibrium
3.1 Market clearing
In each period t,t h e r ea r eN +1commodity markets: the market for ﬁnal good
and the N markets for the diﬀerentiated products. From our earlier discussion
on the eﬃcient nature of market allocation, it is clear that the markets for inter-
mediate products will clear as soon as the market for the ﬁnal good clears. The
supply of ﬁnal good, which we calculated in (2), is given by the eﬃcient use of
the resources of the economy. There are two sources of demand for the ﬁnal good
(all in per capita terms): consumption ct,w h e r e∀l,cl
t = ct by the representative
consumer assumption, and investment in physical capital. Since capital depreci-
ation is 100% in each period, investment in period t is equal to the capital stock
of the next period kt+1. Hence, the market clearing condition for the ﬁnal good
market is
ct + kt+1 = θtk
γ
t .
Note that this condition implies that the capital stock at time t +1is predeter-
mined.
The additional markets to consider are the market for physical capital and
the N equity markets for the ownership of the N ﬁrms. Assuming the market
for the ﬁnal good clears in period t +1 , the demand for physical investment in
period t is kt+1.L e tst be the rate of saving out of aggregate output, so that per
capita aggregate savings are styt. Aggregate savings have to be equal to capital
accumulation as the ﬁrm ownership is not an outlet for aggregate accumulation.
Hence, equilibrium in the physical capital market requires
(10) styt = kt+1.
Together with the ﬁnal goods market clearing equation, this relationship implies
(11) ct =( 1− st)yt.
Finally, the monopoly ﬁrms will be valued by the Euler equation which will
ensure that equity holding in every ﬁrm is a competitive proposition.
133.1.1 Implication for the consumption/savings path
Let us consider one realisation of the path of the economy; in particular the path
of savings {st}
∞
t=0 is determined. First, let us note that, from (3), the value of
output per capita discounted by the rental is predetermined (it is independent of













where s∗ (which will turn out to be the constant saving rate of the fundamental




PV0 (yt)=dtyt = δ
st−1






































Notice that this last condition holds on the fundamental path st = s∗,b u tw i l l
not hold if limt−→∞ st =1as







































Since, from the factor price equation (3), we have
PV 0 (w)=( 1− γ)ρPV 0 (y),
14the intertemporal budget constraint (8), and the fact that the per-capita con-
sumption, equity holdings, must be equal to agent’s l consumption, implies
¯ v0 =( 1− ρ)[PV 0 (y) − y0].
Two remarks:
1. Calculating PV 0 (¯ π), the value of the stream of proﬁts starting at time
t =1(since the current proﬁts have already been distributed), we ﬁnd
PV 0 (¯ π)=( 1− ρ)[PV 0 (y) − y0]=¯ v0,
hence the value of the market portfolio coincides with the fundamental value
of that portfolio.
2. Since the previous equality must hold for every path and that both ¯ v0 and
y0 are ﬁxed at time t =0 , this implies that the present value of income
must be path-independent: the consumer adapts his consumption so that
its present value does not depend on the realisation of uncertainty.
3.2 Rational expectation path
We are going to turn our attention at the equilibrium path of the economy when
agents hold rational expectations and that these expectations are validated by
the data generating process which drives the technology shocks of the economy.
3.2.1 Fundamental path of capital accumulation
Characterisation of the Euler paths Since the Euler equation (9) must hold


















Let us deﬁne the auxiliary variable sl










t and for kt+1 from (10) allows us to write the Euler equation















15Euler paths and equilibrium Any consumption programme can be written,



















however, for an arbitrary sl, this programme may not be feasible (i.e. it can
violate the consumer’s budget constraint) and it may not be an Euler programme,
i.e. it may not satisfy (12). In addition, clearance of the physical capital requires
s
l = s, i.e. ∀t ≥ 0,s
l
t = st;
as the demand for funds to invest in physical capital is, in per-capita terms,
{styt}
∞





t=0. Only Euler consumption
programmes are candidates for an (interior) optimum. Consider the set (as yet
unknown) Sl of all feasible Euler consumption programmes. The optimal con-





























The consumer must solve this problem taking s and y as given. The log speciﬁ-
cation causes the output path y to nicely drop out, but the presence of aggregate
savings s makes this problem non-trivial. However, we can show, with relative
ease, that the deterministic aggregate savings rate s∗ ≡ {st = s∗}
∞
t=0 is in fact
an equilibrium of the economy. Traditionally, this path has been labelled the
fundamental path of the economy.
Fundamental path L e tu sa s s u m et h a tt h ea g g r e g a t es a v i n g sr a t ef o l l o w st h e
deterministic path s∗ ≡ {st = s∗}
∞
t=0. It is clear that the consumption programme
∀t ≥ 0,s l
t = s∗ is feasible and would clear the market for physical capital. How-
ever, to show that this path is indeed an equilibrium path, we need to demonstrate

















1 be the set of all savings that satisfy this property and note that the
marginal utility of consumption is a martingale. The present value of output in





16Hence, the present value at time 0 of output per capita yt,w h i c hi sap r i o r ia
random variable, is path-independent:
PV 0 (yt)=dtyt = δdt−1yt−1 =⇒ PV 0 (yt)=δ


























































where the second equality holds by the representative consumer assumption. Sub-
stituting for PV 0
¡
cl¢










∗, where weightt ≡ δ





2 be the set of all savings that satisfy this property. Note that every element
sl ∈ Sl
2 of is deterministic, unlike the set of all Euler paths Sl
1 w h o s ee l e m e n t sa r e
stochastic processes. The set of all Euler path (sl ∈ Sl
1)w h i c ha r ef e a s i b l e( a l l
realisations of sl belong to Sl
2) has been labelled Sl. A feasible Euler programme
sl can be characterised by the distribution of probability it induces on Sl
2. Hence,

















































where the notation ¯ U is meant to emphasize its deterministic nature. Let us note
that the elements of Sl
2 are barycenters of 1 − s∗ with weights {weightt}
∞
t=0, i.e.
their weighted average is equal to 1 − s∗. A well-known property of a concave
function f is that, if {xi}i∈I are barycenters of ¯ x with weights {weighti}i∈I,t h e n
X
i∈I
weighti f (xi) ≤ f (¯ x).















t (1 − δ)log(1− s









≤ ¯ U (s
∗).


































Since the consumption programme s∗ belongs to the feasible set Sl,i ti st h e
optimal programme and the consumer l will choose ∀t ≥ 0,s l
t = s∗. Q.E.D.
3.2.2 Stock market valuation
















=¯ v0 +( 1− ρ)y0 + γρy0 +
(1 − γ)ρy0
1 − δ











Suppose that initially the price of the market portfolio is higher than its
equilibrium value
¯ v0 =¯ v
∗
0 + ∆v.
The consumer will want to spread this extra value ∆v as consumption over his
inﬁnite life time, and we would have from (8)
PV 0 (c)=¯ v
∗
0 + ∆v +¯ π0 + i
k
0k0 + PV 0 (w)
= ∆v +
δ (1 − ρ)
1 − δ













c0 =( 1− δ)∆v +( 1− s
∗)y0.
i.e. consumption plus investment demand would exceed output
c0 + k1 = y0 +( 1− δ)∆v,
which is clearly incompatible with market clearing.
Valuation through the Euler equation The Euler equation (9), here in-










Since the real return on the market portfolio is
¯ ıt+1 =
¯ vt+1 +¯ πt+1
¯ vt
=
¯ vt+1 +( 1− ρ)yt+1
¯ vt
,





δ(¯ vt+1 +( 1− ρ)yt+1)











Hence, using the method of repeated substitutions, we obtain
¯ vt
yt
=[ 1+δ + ···+ δ



























193.2.3 Individual stock valuation






































































The transversality condition for the market portfolio (15) yields the transver-




























as no component of the sum can be strictly negative. Therefore, we have
v
n












































(1 − δ) δ
τ =1 ,







Also, note that a ﬁrm, which has the same prospect for technological progress as
the economy average, will be worth un,t of the capitalised market value








t = un,t ¯ vt.
203.3 Implications of stock market valuation along the RE
path
Technological progress at the aggregate level Expected jumps in the pro-
ductivity θt do not aﬀect the aggregate valuation of equity. The valuation
occurs as a share of current output which increases only with the rate of
proﬁt in the economy and with the discount factor.
Technological progress for individual ﬁrms (sectors) If the productivity
of a ﬁrm is expected to jump in the future compare to the average (jump
in ϕn,t+τ), the value of equity in this ﬁrm will also jump, the jump being
discounted at the rate δ. The previous remark implies that the increase
in the value of the ﬁrm expected to experience technological progress must
be accompanied by a decrease in the value of the rest of the market, as
aggregate value remains constant.
Increase in the relative demand for an individual product An increase in
the relative share (un,t) of demand for a product has the same qualitative
eﬀect as an increase in the productivity of the ﬁrm.





where ν i st h er a t eo fp r o ﬁt .W h e nt h ed i s c o u n tr a t ei sc l o s et o1 ,t h ee q u i t y
multiplier can be quite large.
Conclusion 1 Only relative technological progress (and changes in the relative
share of demand) aﬀects stock market valuation. Aggregate technological progress
cannot aﬀect the equity multiplier, hence, it cannot explain rising stock market
values in a closed economy.
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